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Abstract: This article analyses the workings of the new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers, 
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was in force until 2008. The paper considers the effects of the new model at the base year of application 
and the growth over time of these effects. On the positive side, the reform has significantly reduced the 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate the new Spanish system of 
intergovernmental transfers that has been in operation since 2009. The article draws 
heavily on Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) and the approach followed is 
fundamentally descriptive: the objective is to understand how the new system works for 
the fifteen “common regime” autonomous communities to which it applies2 and how it 
differs from previous arrangements. 
Since they were established in 1980’s, intergovernmental transfers in Spain have 
aimed at the equalisation of resources per unit of need, so that the same service level 
could be provided by all autonomous communities irrespective of their fiscal capacity.
3
 
The definition of expenditure needs and the identification of differences among 
communities regarding the cost of service provision have been the main areas of 
discussion between central and autonomous governments. The provisions regarding the 
growth of transfers have also come into scrutiny due to the lack of connexion between 
the variation of needs and that of resources.
4
 The reform that we analyse here addresses 
these questions and leads to improvements in both respects that, although not complete, 
we deem significant. 
The agreement on the new model (MEH, 2009b) was reached in July 2009 in the 
Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera (Fiscal and Financial Policy Council), a 
multilateral organ of coordination between central government and autonomous 
                                                 
2
 That excludes the autonomous communities Pais Vasco and Navarra, whose regime is the “foral” 
(“cupo”) system.  
3
 More than the implementation of a specific set of legal provisions, this objective emerges from the 
practice adopted since the system was first established. Although imperfectly, its legal base is more 
clearly stated in the Constitution than in the LOFCA, Ley Organica de Financiacion de las Comunidades 
Autonomas (the specific basic law that regulates intergovernmental fiscal relations between central and 
autonomous jurisdictions). Article 139.1 of the Spanish Constitution (BOE, 1978) says that “All 
Spaniards have the same rights and obligations anywhere in the Spanish territory”, and article 158.1 says 
that “The General State Budget may include an allocation to Autonomous Communities that will depend 
on the State’s services and activities they have undertaken and on the guarantee of a minimum level of 
basic public services throughout the Spanish territory”. More to the point, the recently reformed Estatut 
d’Autonomia de Catalunya (the basic law that regulates the institutional relationships between the 
autonomous community of Catalonia and the central administration of the Spanish State) (BOE, 2006) 
says in its article 206.1 that “The level of financial resources put at the disposal of the Generalitat [the 
government of the Catalan autonomous community] will be based on criteria of expenditure needs and 
will take into account, among other criteria, its fiscal capacity. To this effect, the Generalitat’s resources 
will be, among others, those generated by its tax revenue, plus/minus those obtained from, or required by, 
its participation in the equalizing and solidarity mechanisms.” Similar statements are contained in basic 
laws of other autonomous communities. 
4
 See López-Laborda and Monasterio (2007), Bosch and Durán (2008) and Ruiz-Huerta and Herrero 
(2008). 
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communities, which meets regularly to discuss issues concerning the regular operation 
of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Subsequently, this agreement was 
given legal status through the modification of the LOFCA (BOE, 2009a) and the 
enactment of a national law setting the different provisions of the system (BOE, 
2009b).
5 
The Law makes a complex and unnecessarily circular presentation of the new 
model. The best way to untangle the effective workings of the system is to compare the 
basic structure of both new and old models, and go directly to the final distribution of 
resources that each of them generates. This approach allows us to distinguish elements 
that play an important role from those that are secondary. 
We identify aspects of the reform that in our opinion could be improved, but we 
abstain from advancing normative proposals. For instance, we find unsatisfactory the 
way in which the index of needs enters into the model, but we leave out from this paper 
any suggestion of improvement on this particular aspect.
6
 With this, we intend to avoid 
as much as possible controversial issues and, in a purely positive vein, concentrate on 
actual legal provisions. 
In addition to identifying formally the workings of the model, the article quantifies 
empirically its different elements. Using empirical data from the period 2004-2007, the 
article presents an estimation not only of the starting position of the model, which we 
call year zero, but also of the growth that the system would undergo during the 
following five years of application.
7
 The new model narrows significantly the 
dispersion of resources per capita between autonomous communities and takes into 
account the temporal variation of needs. On the other hand, its cost – an overall increase 
of resources of over 12 per cent – is by far the largest of the five major revisions 
undergone by the system. In terms of the overall increase of resources, we estimate that 
the costs of the other four reforms were as follows: 1987: 6.9 per cent; 1992: 6.1 per 
cent; 1997: 0 per cent; and 2002: 3.5 per cent. 
                                                 
5
 In the rest of this article, the legal text that contains the model is called the “Law”. This model is 
referred to interchangeably as the “present” or “new” model as opposed to the substituted system, which 
is referred to as the “previous” or “old” model. 
6
 We do this in a separate paper: López-Laborda and Zabalza (2010).  
7
 The Law states that the model should be reviewed every five years. 
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There are several articles in Spanish that cover approximately the same ground (De 
la Fuente, 2009; Bosch, 2010a;
8
 López-Laborda, 2010; López-Laborda and Zabalza, 
2010; Zabalza and López-Laborda, 2010) but we feel that an additional account in 
English will be useful for the international reader interested in this subject. In 
comparison with the first two papers noted above, this paper pays more attention to the 
growth of resources and differs from them in its interpretation of the distribution 
structure that the model implies.  
The next section shows the extent of decentralization in Spain and in this context 
anticipates the overall effects of the model that will be described in subsequent sections. 
Section 3 presents the formal structure of the new model. Section 4 compares the 
distribution of resources it generates with that of the old model. Section 5 describes a 
particular element of the model, the guarantee fund for fundamental public services, that 
serves as the main base for the introduction of the index of needs, and to which the Law 
attaches special importance. We show that despite this emphasis, this fund plays no role 
in the distribution of resources in year zero. Section 6 describes the dynamics of the 
model and shows the way in which the temporal variation of needs is taken into 
account, while Section 7 empirically simulates the growth of the system over a five year 
period. Whereas the guarantee fund does not enter into the definition of year zero, it has 
an effect on how resources received by each autonomous community vary over time. 
This is discussed in Section 8. The paper ends with a section of conclusions. 
 
2. The extent of decentralization in Spain 
As Table 1 shows, in 1979, the year that the Spanish system of autonomous 
communities was put into operation, 91 per cent of total public expenditure was 
undertaken by the central government and the social security system, a negligible 0.1 
per cent by all autonomous communities, and 8.9 per cent by provinces and 
municipalities. In 2007, the last year for which final compiled figures exist for the three 
jurisdictions, the percentages were: 50 per cent for central government and social 
security, 35.9 per cent for autonomous communities and 14.1 per cent for provinces and 
municipalities. In the 28 years elapsed, the share of regional public expenditure has 
increased by 35.8 percentage points. The degree of decentralization in resources is less 
                                                 
8
 A shortened version of this paper in English can be found in Bosch (2010b). 
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pronounced but still important: in 1979, 92.9 per cent of public resources were 
essentially national taxes and social security contributions, and the remaining 7.1 per 
cent municipal taxes, provinces having virtually no own taxes. In 2007, national taxes 
and social security contributions represented only 67.9 per cent of total resources, ceded 
and own regional taxes 21.9 per cent, and municipal taxes 10.2 per cent. 
 
 
 
Table 1       
Public expenditure and resource decentralization in Spain    
(Percentages)       
  Public expenditure  Public resources 
  1979 2007  1979 2007 
General Government  91.0 50.0  92.9 67.9 
     (Central Government)  (47.6) (21.7)  (53.5) (38.5) 
     (Social Security)  (43.4) (28.3)  (39.3) (29.4) 
Autonomous Communities
1 
 0.1 35.9  0.0 21.9 
Provinces and Municipalities  8.9 14.1  7.1 10.2 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
1. Includes “common regime” and “foral regime” autonomous communities. 
Source: IGAE (General Government Internal Auditor) 
 
As will be shown in this paper, the new model changes the structure between tax 
revenue and overall cash transfer in favour of tax revenue, and increases significantly 
the total amount of resources received by the fifteen “common regime” autonomous 
communities”. As Table 2 shows, in 2010 we estimate that in the old model assessed 
revenue from ceded taxes (i.e., regional tax capacity) would have represented 69.1 per 
cent of total resources and cash transfer 30.9 per cent. In the new model, on the other 
hand, we estimate that the share of assessed tax revenue rises to 78.7 per cent, while that 
of the transfer falls to 21.3 per cent. In the new model, therefore, assessed tax revenue 
increases its share in total resources by 9.6 percentages points. 
We estimate that in 2010, the old model would have put at the disposal of 
autonomous communities a total amount of resources equivalent to 9.5 per cent of GDP. 
In the new model we estimate that this percentage will rise to 10.7. The new model thus 
adds resources to the system of regional finance to the tune of 1.2 per cent of GDP. 
These resources are all of them added by means of a significant enlargement of ceded 
6                  International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
taxes, which, assessed at standard values,
9
 will contribute fresh money to autonomous 
communities equivalent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. Cash transfers, on the other hand, will 
drop by 0.7 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 2 
Aggregate flows, old and new models
1 
Estimation for year 2010 
(Percentages) 
 
Structure 
 Old New   
 Model Model Variation 
 1 2 3=2–1 
Tax revenue 69.1 78.7 9.6 
Cash transfer 30.9 21.3 -9.6 
Total resources 100.0 100.0 0.0 
    
Percentages of GDP 
 Old New   
 Model Model Variation 
 1 2 3=2–1 
Tax revenue 6.6 8.4 1.8 
Cash transfer 3.0 2.3 -0.7 
Total resources 9.5 10.7 1.2 
1. Applying only to the fifteen “common regime” communities. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The 1.2 per cent of GDP is a net increase in resources, to the extent that expenditure 
responsibilities of autonomous communities remain unchanged as compared with those 
they had under the old system. The outcome is the result of a protracted process of 
negotiations between central government and the fifteen regional governments, which 
took place during the initial phase of the most severe fall in real product that the 
Spanish economy has had to endure since the 1936 civil war. We do not have a 
satisfactory explanation of this outcome, nor is this explanation the purpose of this 
paper. Beyond the obvious fact that it represents a remarkable feat of regional 
governments, we can only point out that the increase in resources must have been, at 
least to some extent, the answer to the mounting difficulties that regional governments 
had to maintain service levels in the health and education systems, both under the 
responsibilities of autonomous communities. 
                                                 
9
 We explain below the way in which standard revenues from ceded taxes are assessed and the role that 
these assessed values play in the model of intergovernmental transfers. 
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3. The basic structure of the model 
Since they were established in the early eighties, intergovernmental transfers in 
Spain have aimed at the equalisation of resources per unit of need, so that the same 
service level could be provided by all autonomous communities irrespective of their 
fiscal capacity. The total amount of resources that at the base year  0t   the system 
would effectively put under the command of a given community,
10
 and therefore the 
expenditure that it could undergo, 0PiE , was equal to the tax revenue actually obtained 
out of the transferred fiscal base (the “ceded taxes”), 0PiT , plus the transfer it received 
from the central government, called initially State Revenue Share, and subsequently 
Sufficiency Fund, 0PiS . 
 0 0 0.P P Pi i iE T S   (1) 
The transfer, 0PiS , was defined as those resources that normatively the system would 
assign to the community, 0PiE
 , minus the revenue that for a given standard tax policy 
the system would assess that community i could obtain from the transferred fiscal base, 
0P
iT
 .
11
 Thus, 
 0 0 0.P P Pi i iS E T
    (2) 
                                                 
10
 In this article we consider only system-related resources. In addition to these resources, the community 
may obtain other resources from own taxes, debt and other commercial and economic operations. For a 
recent review of the Spanish regional finance system, see López-Laborda and Monasterio (2007). We 
index variables of the “previous model” with the superscript P. 
11
 The transfer is defined in terms of assessed rather than actual revenue to introduce an incentive for 
communities to manage diligently their ceded tax basis. Otherwise, whatever the amount of tax revenue 
obtained by the community, the system would always cover the gap between actual tax revenue and 
normative resources. Regarding the main ceded taxes (Personal Income Tax – PIT –, VAT and Excises), 
plus Vehicle Excises, Hydrocarbon Retail Sales Tax and Electricity Tax, standard revenue is the same as 
actual revenue in each community excluding the rise or fall in revenues originated by normative changes 
in national tax rates enacted by each community by virtue of its legal powers (autonomous communities 
have practically no powers concerning the definition of tax basis). Regarding traditional ceded taxes 
(Inheritance and Gift Tax, Capital Transfer Tax, Stamp Duties and Gaming Taxes), in the year in which 
the tax is ceded standard revenue is the same as actual revenue in that year. Subsequently, this initial 
standard revenue is updated according to a common rate of growth for all communities, related to the 
variation of revenue from State taxes, called ITE and which we describe in more detail below. In the last 
reform (2009), the updating rate applied to the Capital Transfer Tax is no longer the common ITE rate, 
but a sort of community specific ITE related to the variation of regional revenue from PIT, VAT and 
Excises. 
8                  International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
Substituting 2 into 1, we obtain the expression that shows the essential nature of the 
previous model: 
  0 0 0 0 .P P P Pi i i iE E T T     (3) 
The resources that the system would effectively put under the command of community 
i, 0P
iE , were those normatively assigned to it, 
0P
iE
 , plus/minus a quantity that would 
depend on the extent to which revenue effectively obtained from the transferred fiscal 
base, 0PiT , was larger/smaller than assessed tax revenue, 
0P
iT
 . Alternatively, rewriting 
3 as 
  0 0 0 0P P P Pi i i iE T E T    , (4) 
we can see that in the old system total resources were the sum of actual tax revenue 
obtained from the ceded tax base, 0PiT , plus/minus the equalising cash transfer 
 0 0P Pi iE T  .12 
For a tax policy equal to the standard,  0 0P Pi iT T  , effective resources for this 
community would be the same as normatively assessed resources. That is, 
 0 0 ,P Pi iE E
  (5) 
and, to the extent that normative resources are distributed among communities 
according to needs, the system would equalise resources per unit of need for all 
communities. 
We show in this paper that the basic structure of the new model is exactly the same 
as that of the old model.
13
 As with the previous model, actual resources, 0iE , come from 
actual tax revenue obtained from ceded taxes, 0iT , plus the cash transfer, 
0
iS . 
 0 0 0 ,i i iE T S   (6) 
where 
                                                 
12
 Literally, this is the way article 206.1 of the Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya defines the Spanish 
system of intergovernmental transfers. See note 2 below. 
13
 To distinguish them from those of the previous model, the variables of the new model do not carry the 
superscript P. 
                                     The new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers                                       9 
 
 0 0 0.i i iS E T
    (7) 
The new model significantly enlarges the fiscal capacity transferred to communities, in 
terms of both their sharing in the main national taxes – PIT, VAT and Excises – and 
their power to alter the corresponding tax rates and bases. However, the main changes 
occur in the definition of the transfer, which is now formed by four elements: the 
Guarantee Fund Transfer, 0
iGFT ; the Sufficiency Fund, 
0
iSF ; the Competitiveness 
Fund, 0
iCF ; and the Cooperation Fund, 
0
iCOF .
14
 Thus, 
 0 0 0 0 0.i i i i iS GFT SF CF COF     (8) 
We discuss below how these four elements are distributed among communities and 
what the eligibility criteria are in order to benefit from the convergence funds. Here we 
want to concentrate on the structure of the new model, and for this purpose it is useful 
to distinguish between the first two elements of expression 8 and the rest. The 
Competitiveness and Cooperation Funds may be called primary elements, in the sense 
that they are not derived from any other element in the system. The Guarantee Fund 
Transfer and the Sufficiency Fund, on the other hand, are derived elements, as they are 
obtained from other primary elements of the model. 
The Guarantee Fund Transfer is defined as the Guarantee Fund, 0iGF , minus 75 per 
cent of assessed tax revenue. That is, 
 0 0 00.75 ,i i iGFT GF T
   (9) 
where assessed tax revenue is a primary element and the guarantee fund a derived 
element
15
. The text of the Law puts a lot of emphasis on the guarantee fund. The Law 
refers to this fund as the source of resources that should cover the cost of fundamental 
services (health, education and social services), and distributes it among communities 
by means of an index of needs – Adjusted Population – so that resources per unit of 
need (according to this index) are the same for all communities. We return to the 
guarantee fund in Section 5, below. 
                                                 
14
 The complete names of the first two elements are: the “Guarantee Fund for Fundamental Public 
Services Transfer” and the “Global Sufficiency Fund”. In what follows we will use the shortened version 
of both names. For the Competitiveness and Cooperation Funds, the Law also uses the generic term 
“Convergence Funds”; occasionally, we shall make use of this generic form.. 
15
 The total amount of the guarantee fund is defined as 75 per cent of total assessed tax revenue plus a 
given quantity called by the Law “State Contribution”. See Section 5 below.    
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The Sufficiency Fund is defined as the difference between, on the one hand, the sum 
of resources of the previous system, which the model calls Status Quo, 0iSQ , and a 
given amount of fresh resources, called Additional Resources 0
iAR , that the central 
government contributes to the system and, on the other hand, the sum of assessed 
revenue, 0
iT
 , and the Guaranty Fund Transfer defined above. That is, 
    0 0 0 0 0 ,i i i i iSF SQ AR T GFT     (10) 
where 0 0 0,   and i i iSQ AR T
  are all primary elements. The status quo element provides the 
link between old and new models since 0 0Pi iSQ E
 . 
Substituting 10 into 8, we obtain the definition of the overall transfer of the new 
model, exclusively in terms of primary elements, 
  0 0 0 0 0 0.i i i i i iS SQ AR CF COF T       (11) 
From expression 11 two interesting results follow: First, the guarantee fund transfer, 
and with it the guarantee fund, cancel out of the system. Despite the emphasis put by the 
Law, the guarantee fund plays no role in determining the overall transfer in year zero, 
nor in its distribution among communities. Second, the basic structure of the new model 
is essentially the same as that of the old model. This can be seen by comparing 
expression 11 with 7 and 2. They have exactly the same structure and the only 
difference refers to the definition of the resources that the system normatively assigns to 
each community, which in the new model is 
 0 0 0 0 0.i i i i iE SQ AR CF COF
      (12) 
Also, substituting 12 into 6, we obtain 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .i i i i i i iE SQ AR CF COF T T        (13) 
As in the old model, community i commands a given amount of resources normatively 
assigned by the system (the four terms enclosed in the first parenthesis of the 
expression), plus/minus an amount of resources that depend on whether the community 
applies a tax policy which generates more or less tax revenue than that assessed for the 
standard tax policy. If the community tax policy is the standard, the last parenthesis 
cancels out; if the community applies a more strict tax policy than the standard, it 
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benefits from the resulting increase in revenues and the transfer is not reduced; finally, 
if the tax policy applied by the community is more lax than the standard, the transfer 
remains the same but the community bears the resulting fall in tax revenues. 
Alternatively, rewriting 13 as 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,i i i i i i iE T SQ AR CF COF T          (14) 
we have the equivalent to expression 4 in the previous model. Actual resources are 
equal to actual tax revenue plus/minus the equalising cash transfer, which in the new 
model is given by the expression in square brackets. 
In all cases, for a tax policy equal to the standard, 0 0i iT T
 , which is the assumption 
we follow in the rest of the paper, the resources the system puts into the hands of 
community i, 0iE
 , are given by expression 12. Again, in year zero the guarantee fund 
plays no role in the determination of resources or in its distribution among communities. 
The way in which needs are introduced into the system is the same as that of the old 
model. In the old model, the relative structure of needs and differences in the cost of 
providing services among communities was taken into account through the term 0PiE
  in 
expression 2. The procedure was to determine a total quantity of resources 0PE , and to 
distribute this total according to some linear combination of need criteria. Let i  be the 
share of resources of community i that results from such procedure,  1i  , then 
0 0P P
i iE E
  .16 
Something very similar is done in the new model, but applied to each of the four 
elements of expression 12. The statistical material attached to the agreed final document 
of the Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera MEH (2009b), gives the total and 
individual community values of the status quo for 2007. Concerning the other three 
elements, the Law itself, BOE (2009), gives first, the total quantity of each of the other 
three elements in nominal terms and for specified years; and second, the criteria of 
distribution of these total quantities among communities. The different criteria of 
                                                 
16
 Normally, i , despite being a share, is loosely referred to in the Spanish literature as an index of needs. 
It is straightforward to transform i  into an index of relative needs i  with mean equal to 1, by defining 
i in  , where n is the number of communities. Then, of course, 
0 0P P
i iE E
  , where 0 0P PE E n  . 
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distribution, together with the eligibility rules for the convergence funds, are the 
equivalent to the i  index of needs of the old model. 
While in the old model the only index of needs is the one used to define the 
distribution of resources in year zero (that is, i ), the new model, in addition to the 
indices of needs used to define the distribution in year zero of the four elements of 12, 
introduces another index (the Adjusted Population index referred to above), which 
although not in the initial distribution, does play a role in the variation of resources over 
time, as will be seen in Section 6 below. 
It is important to point out from the outset that despite the different labels attached 
to each of the four elements of expression 12, all resources are unconditional and their 
budgetary allocation on various expenditures depends exclusively on the autonomous 
community, providing basic national regulations on public service standards are 
fulfilled. The particular labels attached to the four terms of 12 must be seen simply as a 
way to motivate the different distribution rules of each of them. In the next section we 
evaluate empirically expression 12 over the whole set of communities to gain an idea of 
the extent to which fresh resources have been added into the system and how they have 
been distributed. 
 
4. Old and new models 
Table 3 shows the estimated values of the four elements of expression 12 at year 
zero, which under the assumptions used in the simulation corresponds to 2010. We take 
2010 as the starting point of the model, as this is the year in which all fresh resources 
will have accrued and, thus, the year that best measures the complete effect of the 
reform.
17
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The basic data to define the starting point of the model is given for year 2007 (the last year for which, 
at the moment of the political agreement reached between the two jurisdictions, final compiled data for all 
communities existed). The first year in which the model enters into operation is 2009, and fresh resources 
contributed by the central administration are added to the system in two instalments: 2009 and 2010. 
Thus, the year in which all fresh resources have accrued is 2010, which is the year we use in the 
simulation as the starting point (year zero) of the model.  
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Table 3      
Resources of the new model of intergovernmental transfers. Year zero   
(€ Million)      
 
0
iSQ  
0
iAR  
0
iCF  
0
iCOF  
0
iE
  
Autonomous 
Community 
1 2 3 4 5=
4
1
  
Catalunya 15,353 1,365 845 0 17,563 
Galicia 6,520 356 0 255 7,131 
Andalucia 17,876 1,318 0 335 19,530 
Asturias 2,556 106 0 95 2,757 
Cantabria 1,543 94 0 18 1,654 
La Rioja 805 73 0 0 878 
Murcia 2,801 316 37 55 3,210 
Valencia 9,585 902 723 0 11,210 
Aragon 3,144 220 0 35 3,399 
Castilla-La Mancha 4,516 366 0 81 4,963 
Canarias 4,156 427 317 0 4,900 
Extremadura 2,723 123 0 108 2,954 
Baleares 1,974 234 221 0 2,429 
Madrid 12,367 1,213 494 0 14,074 
Castilla y Leon 6,105 287 0 218 6,610 
Total 92,024 7,400 2,638 1,200 103,262 
Relative weight (%) 89.1 7.2 2.6 1.2 100 
Source: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
 
The first column gives the status quo, 0iSQ , which amounts to a total of €92,024 
million. This corresponds to the resources that the communities would have had with 
the old model and serves therefore as the reference to measure the effects of the reform. 
The data come from MEH (2009b).
18
 The figures given in the document refer to 2007, 
the last year for which officially settled figures of the previous model exist, and have 
been updated to 2010. On the basis of empirical information on tax revenue for the 
years 2007 and 2008, and budget figures for 2009 and 2010 (MEH, 2009c), we assume 
assessed tax revenue for 2010 to be 20 per cent below than that of 2007 and that this fall 
is uniform for all communities. These assumptions are also used to update the status 
quo. The simulation exercise presented here is largely illustrative and numerical results 
should be seen under the light of these assumptions. 
                                                 
18
 Strictly, the resources of the old model would be slightly less (0.4 per cent less than 0SQ ) due to the 
incidence in the status quo of the compensation for the elimination of the Wealth Tax. The difference is 
very small and its effect on the distribution negligible; so we take 0iSQ as representative of the resources 
that the old model would have generated in 2010 (see Zabalza and López-Laborda, 2010). 
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Column 2 shows the value of 0
iAR , which amounts to a total of €7,400 million. This 
figure comes from the Law, which specifies that €5,000 million will be first contributed 
in 2009 and €2,400 million added in 2010. We assume that inflation between these two 
years is nil, and therefore use the nominal figures given in the Law.
19
 These resources 
are distributed amongst communities according to, among other criteria, adjusted 
population and its average annual growth over the period 1999 to 2009. Due to data 
availability, we estimate the annualized grow rate of adjusted population using data for 
the period 1999 to 2004 and apply it to the 1999-2009 period. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the value of 0 0 and i iCF COF , which amount respectively to 
totals of €2,638 million and €1,200 million, and are distributed among two different 
subsets of communities with the exception of Murcia. Although eligibility to each fund 
is determined by means of a complex set of rules,
20
 the outcome (and indeed the 
objective aimed at by the new model) is that approximately the first fund benefits 
relatively rich communities, which in general are also the communities that were less 
well treated by the old model, while the second is directed to relatively poor 
communities. The competitiveness fund is distributed according to adjusted population, 
although subject to specific caps and complements, and the cooperation fund is 
distributed according to relative poverty. The total amounts of these two funds are given 
by the Law in nominal Euros of 2009. The actual total amount for the competitiveness 
fund is €2,573 million, to which €65 million are added due to the operation of the Third 
Additional Provision of the Law. According to this provision, those communities with 
resources (before convergence funds) per adjusted inhabitant below the mean, and with 
negative values of both the guaranty fund transfer and the sufficiency fund, are entitled 
to a special complement. Baleares is the only community that fits these conditions, and 
the complement received is €65 million. 
At year zero, and for a tax policy equal to the standard, the new system adds 
€11,238 million over and above the resources that the fifteen communities would have 
                                                 
19
 Notice that these figures, as well as those of the convergence funds, are given by the Law in nominal 
terms (that is, in Euros of the specified years). These nominal values were agreed before the full extent of 
the 2008-2010 shock was really known, a circumstance which clearly inflates the relative importance of 
the amount of fresh resources that the new model adds to the system. 
20
 The communities eligible to the competitiveness fund are those with resources (excluding convergence 
funds) per adjusted inhabitant (the unit of the Adjusted Population index of needs) below the mean or 
below an index of fiscal capacity. The communities eligible to the cooperation fund are those which are 
relatively poor, or have low demographic density or low population growth. 
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obtained with the old system; a 12.2 per cent increase. Although 89.1 per cent of total 
resources are driven by the old model, fresh resources are not distributed as the status 
quo. This is the case with the convergence funds, whose rules of eligibility are clearly 
income oriented, but to some extent it also happens with the so called additional 
resources, AR. Lastly, the bias of the competitiveness fund in favour of relatively rich 
communities is only partially compensated by the bias of the cooperation fund in favour 
of relatively poor communities, as the first fund distributes 2.6 per cent of all resources 
versus 1.2 per cent the second fund. 
 
Table 4 
Comparison between old and new models. Resources per capita 
 € per capita  Relative deviation (%)  Relative 
Autonomuos 
0 0
i iSQ H  
0 0
i iE H
   
0 0
i iSQ H  
0 0
i iE H
   gain (%) 
Community 1 2  3 4  5=4-3 
Catalunya 2,129 2,436 97.9 99.8 1.9 
Galicia 2,352 2,572 108.1 105.4 -2.7 
Andalucia 2,218 2,423 102.0 99.3 -2.7 
Asturias 2,378 2,565 109.3 105.1 -4.2 
Cantabria 2,694 2,887 123.8 118.3 -5.5 
La Rioja 2,605 2,842 119.8 116.4 -3.4 
Murcia 2,012 2,306 92.5 94.5 2.0 
Valencia 1,962 2,295 90.2 94.0 3.8 
Aragon 2,425 2,621 111.5 107.4 -4.1 
Castilla-La Mancha 2,284 2,510 105.0 102.8 -2.2 
Canarias 2,051 2,419 94.3 99.1 4.8 
Extremadura 2,498 2,710 114.9 111.0 -3.8 
Baleares 1,915 2,357 88.1 96.6 8.5 
Madrid 2,033 2,314 93.5 94.8 1.3 
Castilla y Leon 2,415 2,614 111.0 107.1 -3.9 
Total 2,175 2,441 100.0 100.0 0,0 
CV (%) 11.1 7.7    
Source: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) and own calculations 
 
Due to the different size of communities, the comparison between old and new 
models is best done in terms of resources standardized by some normalizing factor. 
Table 4 shows in columns 1 and 2 resources per capita of respectively the old and new 
models.
21
 The old model distributes on average €2,175 per capita, with a coefficient of 
variation (CV) around this mean of 11.1 per cent, while the new model distributes more 
money, €2,441 per capita, and much more uniformly – a CV of 7.7 per cent. 
                                                 
21
 The autonomous community inhabitants, 0iH , used in Table 4 correspond to 2007 and  are taken from 
the agreed final document of the Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera (MEH, 2009b). The data are 
shown in Table 6 (column 1) below.  
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Figure 1 
Comparison between the old and new models 
Relative deviation of resources per capita. Year zero 
 
Old model 
 
 
New model 
 
Source: Table 4 
 
The new model, therefore, significantly flattens the distribution of resources per 
capita around the mean. In the old model the distribution ranges from Cantabria that 
gets 23.8 per cent more resources per capita than the mean, to Baleares that gets 11.9 
per cent less – a difference of 35.7 percentage points. In the new model the two 
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
Mean E/H
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
Mean E/H
                                     The new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers                                       17 
 
extremes of the distribution are Cantabria that gets 18.3 per cent more resources, and 
Valencia that gets 6.0 per cent less resources – a difference of 24.3 percentage points.  
The effect of the new model on each community can also be seen in Figure 1, where 
relative deviations are presented in an ordered fashion. The new model changes 
somewhat the ordering of communities and, as pointed out above, flattens significantly 
the distribution of relative deviations. The first five communities in terms of relative 
gain are Baleares (8.5 percentage points), Canarias (4.8), Valencia (3.8), Murcia (2.0) 
and Catalunya (1.9).
22
 The first five communities in terms of relative loss are Cantabria 
(-5.5 percentage points), Asturias (-4.2), Aragon (-4.1), Castilla y Leon (-3.9) and 
Extremadura (-3.8). We show in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 that approximately the 
same qualitative results would be obtained if instead of resources per capita we used 
resources per adjusted inhabitant (the normalizing factor obtained from the adjusted 
population index of needs). 
 
5. The Guarantee Fund 
We now return to the guarantee fund. Substituting 9 into 8, and the resulting 
expression into 7, we obtain another expression of normative resources, this time as a 
function of the guarantee fund: 
 0 0 0 0 0 00.25 .i i i i i iE T GF SF CF COF
       (15) 
Table 5 evaluates empirically expression 15. The new elements that appear in this 
decomposition are those shown in columns 1 to 3, while columns 4 to 6 are the same as 
the corresponding ones in Table 3. For all communities, the fourth part of assessed tax 
revenue, as column 1 shows, equals €20,307 million, which implies that total assessed 
tax revenue is €81,228 million. The new model significantly enlarges the share of 
communities into the main tax bases. In terms of assessed revenue, the shares go from 
33 to 50 per cent in PIT; from 35 to 50 per cent in VAT; and from 40 to 58 per cent in 
Excises. A key difference between the PIT and the VAT is that the autonomous 
                                                 
22
 The big gain experienced by Baleares is in part a consequence of the Third Additional Provision of the 
Law discussed above, which gives this community a complement of €65 million. This represents a 39.4 
per cent increase of the resources this community would be entitled to without such complement (€156 
million). It should also be noted that Canarias, due to its particular geographical situation, has a special 
economic and fiscal regime that yields resources additional to those obtained from the system described 
here. 
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communities must each set their rate for their 50% of PIT as of 2011 but have no say 
with respect to the VAT. As a result, in the new model assessed tax revenue, 0T  , 
represents 78.7 per cent of total resources and the overall transfer, 0S , 21.3 per cent. In 
the old model these percentages would have been 69.1 and 30.9 respectively. Tax 
revenue, therefore, gains 9.6 percentage points in the structure of resources (see Table 2 
above). 
 
 
Table 5       
Another decomposition of resources. Year zero    
(€ Million)       
 
00.25 iT
  0
iGF  
0
iSF  
0
iCF  
0
iCOF  
0
iE
  
Autonomous 
Community 
1 2 3 4 5 6=
5
1
  
Catalunya 4,226 11,582 910 845 0 17,563 
Galicia 1,082 4,768 1,026 0 255 7,131 
Andalucia 3,174 12,919 3,101 0 335 19,530 
Asturias 503 1,808 351 0 95 2,757 
Cantabria 288 928 420 0 18 1,654 
La Rioja 151 509 217 0 0 878 
Murcia 553 2,223 342 37 55 3,210 
Valencia 2,330 7,783 373 723 0 11,210 
Aragon 684 2,227 453 0 35 3,399 
Castilla-La Mancha 777 3,434 671 0 81 4,963 
Canarias 395 3,406 783 317 0 4,900 
Extremadura 348 1,886 613 0 108 2,954 
Baleares 640 1,682 -115 221 0 2,429 
Madrid 4,037 9,281 262 494 0 14,074 
Castilla y Leon 1,119 4,409 865 0 218 6,610 
Total 20,307 68,845 10,272 2,638 1,200 103,262 
Relative weight (%) 19.7 66.7 9.9 2.6 1.2 100.0 
Source: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010)   
 
The aggregate figure for the guarantee fund is defined as 75 per cent of total 
assessed tax revenue, *00.75T , plus a quantity called by the Law “State Contribution”, 
0SC  
 0 0 00.75 ,GF T SC   (16) 
where 0SC , in its turn, is the sum of additional resources, 0AR , and an allocation of 
€524 million on account of health complementary assistance and insularity. At year 
zero, the guarantee fund turns out to be equal to €68,845 million, equivalent to 
approximately two thirds of total resources. This total is then distributed among 
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communities according to a new index of needs called Adjusted Population, AP, which 
is explicitly defined by the Law. 
The AP index is formed by the sum of seven empirical indicators of need, which 
together with their corresponding weights are: population (which distributes 30 per cent 
of the total amount of the fund), area (1.8), dispersion (0.6), insularity (0.6), health 
assisted population (38), population older than sixty five (8.5) and population younger 
than seventeen (20.5). Area is measured as the number of square kilometres taken up by 
the community; dispersion is the number of single municipal entities,
23
 and insularity 
the minimum distance in kilometres between the islands and the mainland territory. The 
number of health assisted people depends on criteria laid down in national legislation. 
Table 6 shows, in columns 2 and 3, the value of this index expressed in population 
(column 2) and relative (column 3) terms. For comparison purposes, column 1 shows 
unadjusted population for 2007. 
 
Table 6 
Adjusted Population index of needs 
  Adjusted Relative 
 Population Population AP Index 
 
0
iH  
0
iN  
0
i  
Autonomous Community 1 2 3 
Catalunya 7,210,508 7,117,437 0.1682 
Galicia 2,772,533 2,929,898 0.0693 
Andalucia 8,059,461 7,939,242 0.1877 
Asturias 1,074,862 1,111,259 0.0263 
Cantabria 572,824 570,318 0.0135 
La Rioja 308,968 313,070 0.0074 
Murcia 1,392,117 1,365,915 0.0323 
Valencia 4,885,029 4,783,008 0.1131 
Aragon 1,296,655 1,368,284 0.0323 
Castilla-La Mancha 1,977,304 2,110,248 0.0499 
Canarias 2,025,951 2,093,063 0.0495 
Extremadura 1,089,990 1,158,764 0.0274 
Baleares 1,030,650 1,033,742 0.0244 
Madrid 6,081,689 5,703,404 0.1348 
Castilla y Leon 2,528,417 2,709,305 0.0640 
Total 42,306,958 42,306,958 1.0000 
Sources: MEH (2009b) and Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
 
                                                 
23
 Despite being called “dispersion”, this variable (the number of single municipal entities) is not 
standardized with respect to any measure of area. 
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Column 2 of Table 5 shows the result of distributing among communities the total 
amount of the guarantee fund according to the AP index of needs shown in Table 6. 
Thus, 
 0 0 0.i iGF GF  (17) 
0
iGF could be seen as a measure of what the new model considers the expenditure needs 
for fundamental services. However, it must be kept in mind that all resources, those 
needed to finance fundamental services and those needed to finance the rest of services, 
are unconditional. The fact that the model assigns, say, €17,563 million to Catalunya, of 
which €11,582 million are in principle provided for fundamental services, is a choice 
that does not generate any practical obligation for the Catalan government. Nor does the 
model contain any mechanism that will insure that the Catalan government will use 
these €11,582 million on fundamental services, nor would the Catalan government 
agree with such mechanism as it would seriously impair the legally granted expenditure 
autonomy it enjoys.
24
 
This is an important point in order to understand the distribution structure of the 
new model in year zero, and it is therefore convenient to elaborate further on the role 
played by the guarantee fund. From the description so far, we have two ways of 
representing the amount of resources that, for a standard tax policy, the system puts 
under the command of communities: expressions 12 and 15, which for convenience we 
repeat here. 
 0 0 0 0 0.i i i i iE SQ AR CF COF
      (12) 
 0 0 0 0 0 00.25 .i i i i i iE T GF SF CF COF
       (15) 
It is tempting to conclude from expression 15 that assessed tax revenue and the 
guarantee fund play a role in the distribution of resources of the new model, but this 
would be a mistake. Assessed tax revenue and the guarantee fund appear in 15 due only 
to the fact that this expression still contains the sufficiency fund 0iSF  which is an 
equalising transfer. 
                                                 
24
 This is clearly an instance of what Laurent and Vaillancourt (2004) call “labelling” in systems of 
intergovernmental transfers. In this case, a part of total resources are given a name by the Law with 
nothing being done to ensure that those resources are spent on the labelled items. 
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If in 15, expression 10 is substituted for 0
iSF , then we go back to expression 12, 
where neither assessed tax revenue nor the guarantee fund play any role. The 
distribution structure of the new model emerges from the criteria that guide the 
distribution of the four primary elements in 12. As far as the status quo is concerned, the 
distribution is guided by the indicators of need of the previous model; and the other 
three terms – additional resources and the two convergence funds – are distributed 
according to three different sets of variables and rules of eligibility that are explicitly 
defined by the Law. 
We may state, as the Law seems keen to pretend, that a part of total resources, 
namely the guarantee fund, is distributed according to the index AP. But then, the rest 
must be distributed in such a way that all resources respect the distribution implicit in 
expression 12. This can be seen perhaps more clearly, adding and subtracting 0iGF  to 
expression 12, 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .i i i i i i iE GF SQ AR CF COF GF        (18) 
The fact that the Law identifies a portion of resources, calls it guarantee fund and 
distributes it according to the AP index, does not alter the overall distribution of 
resources. The guarantee fund will effectively be distributed according to AP, but the 
parenthesis in expression 18 will be distributed so that the effect of AP in the system is 
neutralized and the joint distribution of the four primary elements in 12 emerges 
again.
25
 
After year zero, however, the guarantee fund has an influence on resources because, 
according to the rules that determine the growth of the system, the distribution of the 
sufficiency fund gets fixed in year zero and ceases to act as an equalising mechanism in 
subsequent years; it simply grows according to the ITE rate of growth that we define in 
the next section, which is common to all communities. Thus, the way in which in year 
zero resources (net of the two convergence funds) are partitioned between (25 per cent 
of) assessed tax revenue, guarantee fund and sufficiency fund matters for the 
distribution of resources among communities in subsequent years. In the following two 
sections we turn to the issue of how the system grows over time and evaluate how much 
                                                 
25
 López-Laborda and Zabalza (2010) use this argument to define a global index of needs for all the 
resources of the system. 
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the size of the guarantee fund matters for the variation of the distribution of resources 
over time. 
 
 
6. Growth of resources 
In the previous model, the growth of resources between years 0 and t followed a 
very simple set of rules: assessed tax revenue, 0PiT
 , grew at its own rate of growth i , 
and the transfer, 0PiS , grew at the common rate for all communities 
I  – called the ITE 
(Ingresos Tributarios del Estado) rate of growth. The ITE rate of growth I  measures 
the growth between years 0 and t of the central government revenue from Personal 
Income Tax, VAT and Excises. For a tax policy equal to the standard, equation 1 above 
reads 
 0 0 0P P Pi i iE T S
     
Then, according to the above growth rules, resources at year t in the previous model 
were: 
    0 01 1 ,Pt P P Ii i i iE T S       
which can be rewritten as: 
     0 1 1 1 ,Pt P Ii i i i iE E              (19) 
where 0 0P Pi i iT E
  . That is, in the previous model, the factor of growth of resources 
(the expression in brackets) was a weighted average of 1  and 1+ Ii  , where the 
respective weights were the shares for each community of assessed tax revenue and 
transfer in total resources. 
In the new model things are somewhat more complicated. The rules of growth are 
given by the Law with reference to the elements of expression 15 above. The temporal 
variation of the first term, 00.25 iT
 , is driven by the rate of growth of the community i 
assessed tax revenue, i . Regarding the guaranty fund, 
0
iGF , the model proceeds in two 
steps: First, the variation of the total amount of the fund is driven by the rate of growth 
of aggregate assessed tax revenue   as far as the component 00.75T   of its definition is 
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concerned (see expression 16 above), and by the ITE rate I  regarding the state 
contribution component 0SC . Second, the AP index for year t is applied to this total to 
obtain the amount for each community. 
The growth of the sufficiency fund, 0
iSF , is driven by the rate 
I , common to all 
communities. The two convergence funds follow a two step procedure similar to that of 
the guarantee fund. The total amount of the competitiveness fund, 0CF , is driven by I  
if the Third Additional Provision of the Law referred to above does not enter into 
operation, and by a rate of growth greater than I  if it does; let us call the resulting rate 
of growth c . This total amount for year t is then distributed among eligible 
communities according to the index of needs AP for that year. However, the 
corresponding allocations are subject to a series of caps and floors with the consequence 
that the rates of variation of the individual allocations of this fund end up being specific 
to each eligible community and variable over time. We call these rates ci . Finally, the 
total amount of the cooperation fund is driven again by I , and this total amount for 
year t is distributed among eligible communities according to the value of the index of 
relative poverty referred to above for that year. We call the resulting rates coi . 
To clarify how these rules enter into the model it is useful to rewrite 15 as follows: 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.25 0.75 ,i i i i i iE T T SC SF CF COF         (20) 
where 16 and 17 have been used. According to the above growth rules, resources for 
community i at year t are: 
 
     
     
0 0 0
0 0 0
0.25 1 0.75 1 1
         1 1 1 ,
t t I
i i i i
I c co
i i i i i
E T T SC
SF CF COF
   
  
          
    
 (21) 
and resources for all communities: 
 
     
     
0 0 0
0 0 0
0.25 1 0.75 1 1
         1 1 1 .
t I
I c I
E T T SC
SF CF COF
  
  
          
    
 (22) 
The resulting growth pattern is obviously different from that of the previous model, 
but it can easily be expressed in terms of the framework given by 19 above. In the new 
model we have from 7 that 
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 0 0 0.i i iE T S
    
Writing 20 in terms of assessed tax revenue plus the cash transfer, we have: 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.75 0.75 ,i i i i i i iE T T SC T SF CF COF             (23) 
where the cash transfer is the block of terms contained in the square brackets. 
The outcome of the above growth rules is that, for the new model, the rate of growth 
of total resources is a weighted average of i  and the rate of growth of the terms 
contained in the square brackets of 23, which itself is a composite result from applying 
these rules to each of its six elements. That is, 
  
     
     
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
0.75 1 1 0.75 1
1 .
1 1 1
t I
i i it
i i i
I c co
i i i i i
T SC T
E T
SF CF COF
   

  
 
 
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 (24) 
If we call the growth factor associated to the cash transfer1 si , we have: 
     0 1 1 1 ,t si i i i i iE E              (25) 
where 0 0i i iT E
  . Assessed tax revenue grows as in the old model, but the new cash 
transfer grows at a rate that is specific for each community and, among other things, 
incorporates the change in needs.
26
 
 
7. Empirical simulation 
Methodology and data 
The simulation methodology can be described as follows: First, empirical data for 
the growth rates of assessed tax revenue, ITE, need variables and GDP are used. Annual 
growth rates of assessed tax revenue and ITE are estimated as the average of observed 
growth rates of these items from 2004 to 2007, and are taken from MEH (2006 and 
2009a). The growth rates of each of the need indicators and GDP (used in the eligibility 
rule of the cooperation fund and its distribution) correspond also to the average of 
period 2004 to 2007 and are taken from the National Statistics Institute. Only one rate 
                                                 
26
 For an expression that formally shows how the growth factor of the cash transfer  1 si  is related to 
the growth of needs and to ,   and I c coi i   , see López-Laborda and Zabalza (2010). 
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of growth for each concept is estimated, and this rate is used as the average annual rate 
over the whole simulated quinquennium. The years 2004 to 2007 correspond to a period 
of cyclical expansion and this explains, despite the averaging, the relatively high growth 
rates used in the estimation. However, it is considered preferable to work with empirical 
rather than with hypothetical data. This choice may influence absolute effects but, as 
with the estimates of year zero, should make little difference to relative effects, which 
are the main object of the exercise. 
Second, despite working with average annual rates, the five years of the 
quinquennium are simulated.
27
 This is done to obtain a more realistic profile of the 
annual growth of the convergence funds. Because of the eligibility rules, this profile 
turns out to be specific to each community and subject to potential discontinuities. Had 
the simulation restricted the period of interest to only one year (or equivalently to the 
whole of the quinquennium), these particularities would have gone unnoticed. 
Table 7 repeats for year one the information of Table 6 and shows the average 
annual rates of growth of adjusted population. Although the new model uses each year 
the relative structure of needs, i , in order to see how needs change over time, it is more 
informative to use the growth of adjusted population, ni . 
 
Table 7     
Growth of needs     
  Adjusted   
 Population Population   
Autonomous 
1
iH  
1
iN  
1
i  1
n
i  
Community 1 2 3 4 
Catalunya 7.347.985 7.257.699 0,1689 1,020 
Galicia 2.779.753 2.943.242 0,0685 1,005 
Andalucia 8.187.399 8.055.204 0,1874 1,015 
Asturias 1.075.229 1.113.916 0,0259 1,002 
Cantabria 578.967 576.663 0,0134 1,011 
La Rioja 314.284 318.679 0,0074 1,018 
Murcia 1.426.194 1.397.263 0,0325 1,023 
Valencia 5.004.556 4.902.312 0,1141 1,025 
Aragon 1.312.736 1.383.908 0,0322 1,011 
Castilla-La Mancha 2.022.064 2.147.754 0,0500 1,018 
Canarias 2.064.151 2.130.479 0,0496 1,018 
Extremadura 1.094.936 1.162.030 0,0270 1,003 
Baleares 1.057.159 1.058.695 0,0246 1,024 
Madrid 6.176.880 5.810.546 0,1352 1,019 
                                                 
27
 This article only shows the simulation results corresponding to the last year of the quinquennium, but 
the intervening years are available upon request.  
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Castilla y Leon 2.540.022 2.723.926 0,0634 1,005 
Total 42.982.316 42.982.316 1,0000 1,016 
Sources: MEH(2009b) and Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
 
As can be seen in column 4, total needs are assumed to grow at an annual average 
rate of 1.6 per cent. Valencia, Baleares and Murcia are the three communities with the 
largest growth of needs, and Asturias, Extremadura and Galicia the three communities 
with the smallest growth. Of the seven need indicators, all of them vary over time 
except area, dispersion and insularity.
28
 
The ITE annual growth rate is 10.9 per cent,  1 1.109I  , and Table 8 shows the 
annual average growth rate of assessed tax revenue. Tax capacity for all communities 
grows 9.7 per cent per year. Madrid, Canarias and Castilla-La Mancha are the three 
communities where assessed tax revenue grows most, and at the other end we find 
Baleares, Asturias and Galicia. Notice that the ITE annual growth rate differs from the 
growth rate of aggregate assessed tax revenue (10.9 per cent versus 9.7 per cent). This is 
because the shares of Personal Income Tax, VAT and Excises are different for central 
and autonomous jurisdictions, and also because assessed tax revenue includes other 
fully ceded taxes, such as Inheritance and Gift Tax, Capital Transfer Tax, Stamp Duties, 
Gaming Taxes, Vehicles Excises, Hydrocarbon Retail Sales Tax and Electricity Tax. 
 
Table 8  
Growth of assessed tax revenue 
 Assessed 
 Tax Revenue 
 1 i  
Catalunya 1.095 
Galicia 1.087 
Andalucia 1.096 
Asturias 1.086 
Cantabria 1.093 
La Rioja 1.093 
Murcia 1.103 
Valencia 1.097 
Aragon 1.097 
Castilla-La Mancha 1.105 
Canarias 1.106 
Extremadura 1.089 
                                                 
28
 Observe that if an autonomous community merged municipalities in order to obtain economies of scale, 
it would loose under this criterion. In practice this is not likely to happen, as the tendency in the past has 
been towards division rather than merger of municipalities. 
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Baleares 1.078 
Madrid 1.109 
Castilla y Leon 1.090 
Total 1.097 
Sources: MEH (2006 and 2009a) 
 
Results 
The growth of the system is obtained by applying these rates of growth to the 
procedure described in Section 6 above. Table 9 shows the figures for the last year of 
the quinquennium. Assessed tax capacity grows at an average annual rate of 9.7 per 
cent. The guarantee fund grows at a rate of 9.9 per cent, which is a weighted average of 
the rate of growth of assessed tax revenue (9.7 per cent) and the ITE growth rate (10.9 
per cent). The sufficiency and cooperation funds both grow at the ITE rate (10.9 per 
cent) and the competitiveness fund somewhat less, 10.4 per cent, due to fact that in the 
last year of the quinquennium Baleares is no longer eligible for the Third Additional 
Provision. The overall result is that total resources grow 9.9 per cent per year.  
 
Table 9       
Resources of the new model. Year five
1    
(€ Million)       
 
50,25 iT
  5
iGF  
5
iSF  
5
iCF  
5
iCOF  
5
iE
  
Autonomous 
Communitiy 
1 2 3 4 5 6
5
1
  
Catalunya 6,657 18,892 1,321 1,566 0 28,435 
Galicia 1,642 7,217 1,692 0 396 10,946 
Andalucia 5,013 20,550 5,146 0 517 31,226 
Asturias 759 2,707 573 0 148 4,188 
Cantabria 448 1,451 690 0 29 2,618 
La Rioja 236 824 355 0 0 1,415 
Murcia 904 3,683 558 73 94 5,311 
Valencia 3,695 13,022 544 1,080 0 18,341 
Aragon 1,089 3,487 732 0 56 5,364 
Castilla-La Mancha 1,279 5,548 1,110 0 136 8,073 
Canarias 653 5,509 1,296 366 121 7,945 
Extremadura 533 2,830 1,025 0 171 4,559 
Baleares 932 2,804 -215 232 0 3,753 
Madrid 6,768 15,070 196 1,003 0 23,037 
Castilla y Leon 1,720 6,700 1,421 0 348 10,189 
Total 32,329 110,294 16,443 4,320 2,015 165,401 
Relative weights 19.5 66.7 9.9 2.6 1.2 100.0 
Annual average growth 9.7 9.9 10.9 10.4 10.9 9.9 
Source: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
1. Simulation obtained with assumed growth rates corresponding to the period 2004-2007. 
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Regarding individual results, the set of communities that benefits from the 
competitiveness fund remains stable during the whole quinquennium, while that of the 
cooperation fund experiences the addition of Canarias, which becomes eligible in the 
second year. The complex rules of eligibility, thus, generate a very particular and 
variable pattern of distribution. The economic logic of the eligibility rules of the 
competitiveness fund is not apparent from the text of the Law, but the final outcome 
suggests that this instrument somewhat compensates those (mostly rich) communities 
that were worst treated by the old model. The logic of the cooperation fund is more 
familiar, but a doubt remains whether this fund is an instrument of regional policy rather 
than an element of an equalising system of intergovernmental grants. Overall, judging 
from the way these funds work, they seem designed to satisfy particular demands of 
communities. 
The implementation and management of the new model will not be easy. To take 
into account the temporal variation of needs adds an evident complication to the model, 
but this is amply compensated by the closer response of resources to changes in 
communities’ socio-demographic characteristics. Given the structural nature of needs 
and the gradual way in which they change, we should not expect great differences 
between provisional and final transfers, although the period in which provisional 
transfers become final will inevitably lengthen. The biggest management problem will 
be that of the two convergence funds and, particularly, that of the competitiveness fund. 
The eligibility conditions and the adjustments contemplated by the model depend on the 
variation of economic and demographic variables, the evolution of which is sometimes 
measured with significant delays. The potential exit of some community after having 
received provisional transfers during perhaps several years, may pose non negligible 
difficulties.
29
 
Table 10 compares, in per capita terms, base and last year of the quinquennium and 
Figure 2 presents the relative gain of each community over this period in an ordered 
fashion. The most noticeable feature is the widening of the distribution: the coefficient 
                                                 
29
 Although not considered in the Law, a subsequent public statement from the Spanish Economics and 
Finance Minister, Ms. Salgado, seems to suggest that the usual procedure consisting of provisional 
advances followed by final payments will not be available in the case of convergence funds, and that the 
corresponding transfers will be made only when the final figures can be assessed. As compared with 
expectations held by communities and based on the text of the Law, this would impose a severe delay in 
the perception of resources. However, it remains to be seen what will be the practical consequences of 
this statement. 
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of variation goes from 7.7 per cent in year zero to 9.1 per cent in year five. In part, this 
is due to the loss in year five of the special complement received by Baleares during the 
previous four years as a result of the Third Additional Provision (see note 21 above), 
but even without Baleares the coefficient of variation would increase from 7.9 per cent 
to 8.7 per cent. 
 
Table 10 
Growth of resources per capita (t5 vs t0) 
 € per capita  Relative deviation (%) Relative 
Autonomous  
0 0
i iE H
  5 5
i iE H
   
0 0
i iE H
  5 5
i iE H
   gain (%) 
Communtiy 1 2  3 4  5=4-3 
Catalunya 2,436 3,588 99.8 99.4 -0.4 
Galicia 2,572 3,897 105.4 107.9 2.6 
Andalucia 2,423 3,581 99.3 99.2 -0.1 
Asturias 2,565 3,890 105.1 107.7 2.7 
Cantabria 2,887 4,333 118.3 120.0 1.7 
La Rioja 2,842 4,205 116.4 116.5 0.1 
Murcia 2,306 3,381 94.5 93.6 -0.8 
Valencia 2,295 3,327 94.0 92.2 -1.9 
Aragon 2,621 3,890 107.4 107.7 0.3 
Castilla-La Mancha 2,510 3,651 102.8 101.1 -1.7 
Canarias 2,419 3,572 99.1 98.9 -0.2 
Extremadura 2,710 4,089 111.0 113.3 2.2 
Baleares 2,357 3,207 96.6 88.8 -7.7 
Madrid 2,314 3,505 94.8 97.1 2.3 
Castilla y Leon 2,614 3,939 107.1 109.1 2.0 
Total 2,441 3,610 100.0 100.0 0.0 
CV (%) 7.7 9.1    
Sources: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) and own calculations 
 
Communities than gain with the new model are the ones that tend to loose with the 
passing of time and vice versa. The pattern of growth, therefore, eliminates in part the 
gains in uniformity obtained with the new model. Uniformity may not be a sufficiently 
strong criterion on which to judge the adequacy of the rules of growth of the system, but 
the new model comes out with results that in principle seem to go against its purported 
objective to take into account the temporal change of needs. Asturias and Galicia, the 
two communities whose increase in resources per capita over time is the largest, are also 
the ones whose needs grow the least; while Baleares and Valencia, the two communities 
in which resources grow the least, are both of them the ones with the highest growth of 
needs. 
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Figure 2 
New model; comparison between year zero and year five 
Relative deviation of resources per capita 
 
Year zero 
 
 
Year five 
 
Source: Table 10 
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Given that needs and population are positively correlated, however, the negative 
association between the growth of resources per capita and the growth of needs may to 
some extent be expected, and have little to do with the model. A better way to look at 
this question is to compare directly the growth of resources with the growth of needs. 
Table 11 and Figure 3 do precisely this, using relative shares in order to facilitate the 
comparison. There is a positive association between the growth of relative resources and 
the growth of relative needs (a correlation coefficient of 0.78), mainly due to the fact 
that the guarantee fund, and to some extent the competitiveness fund, are distributed 
according to the adjusted population index of needs. However, the relationship is far 
from perfect, which is what we would require to ensure that horizontal equity is 
maintained over time.
30
 In general, for communities whose needs (relative to the overall 
level of needs) have grown, the growth of resources (relative to the overall amount of 
resources) is less than the growth of relative needs, and vice versa. The growth of 
relative resources is less than the growth of relative needs in Baleares (-1.52 percentage 
points), Valencia (-0.45), Catalunya (-0.15), La Rioja (-0.06) and Murcia (-0.02), while 
the opposite is true for the rest of communities. The five communities for which the 
difference between the growth of relative resources and the growth of relative needs is 
largest are: Extremadura (0.55 percentage points), Asturias (0.29), Castilla y Leon 
(0.28), Galicia (0.28) and Cantabria (0.25). 
 
Table 11   
Growth of relative resources and 
growth of relative needs
1
 
Average annual rates 
(Percentages)   
 
5 5
0 0
i
i
E E
E E
 
 
 
5 5
0 0
i
i
N N
N N
 
Valencia 0,43 0,87 
Baleares -0,72 0,79 
Murcia 0,65 0,68 
Catalunya 0,22 0,36 
Madrid 0,44 0,27 
Canarias 0,25 0,19 
La Rioja 0,12 0,19 
Castilla-La Mancha 0,31 0,17 
Andalucia -0,04 -0,14 
Aragon -0,30 -0,46 
Cantabria -0,24 -0,49 
                                                 
30
 See López-Laborda and Zabalza (2010). Based on the equality of these two rates of growth for all 
communities, these authors propose a growth mechanism that maintains horizontal equity over time. 
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Castilla y Leon -0,77 -1,05 
Galicia -0,85 -1,13 
Extremadura -0,74 -1,30 
Asturias -1,06 -1,34 
Total 0,00 0,00 
1.As measured by adjusted population. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Growth of relative resources and growth of relative needs 
 
Source: Table 11 
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In Section 5 above we show that, in year zero, the guarantee fund has no influence 
on total resources or in the distribution of these resources among communities. We 
point out as well that, due to the growth mechanism posited by the model, the size of the 
guarantee fund does have an influence on the distribution of resources in subsequent 
years. Here we address the question of evaluating empirically the extent of this 
influence. This is an interesting question on its own, and it is also useful to understand 
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Given that assessed tax revenue, the guarantee fund transfer and the sufficiency fund 
do not depend on the two convergence funds,
31
 we concentrate on resources net of these 
two funds; we call this concept “resources before funds”, RBF. Subtracting the two 
convergence funds from 8 and using 7, the definition of 0iRBF  is: 
 0 0 0 0.i i i iRBF T GFT SF
    (26) 
Subtracting the two convergence funds from 12, we find that, in terms of primary 
variables, resources before funds is also the sum of the status quo and additional 
resources, 
 0 0 0.i i iRBF SQ AR   (27) 
Expressions 26 and 27 show the basic identity of the new model: resources before funds 
are the status quo plus additional resources (expression 27), which, in terms of the 
channels trough which communities receive funds, can also be expressed as the sum of 
assessed tax revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund (expression 26). The 
right hand side of both expressions must always be equal. Therefore, given that the 
status quo and additional resources are exogenous (primary) variables, the partition of 
resources between tax revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund cannot be 
independent of each other. We may label a part of resources as guarantee fund transfer, 
and indeed this part may be anything we want. But then tax revenue and the sufficiency 
fund will adjust themselves so that the basic identity 
 0 0 0 0 0i i i i iT GFT SF SQ AR
      (28) 
continues to hold. 
Using 10, expression 26 can be rewritten as: 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .i i i i i i iRBF T GFT SQ AR T GFT         
To see what influence labelling has on the resources of community i, let us introduce a 
partition parameter k   0k  ,32 such that 
                                                 
31
 Although the opposite is not true, since the two convergence funds do depend on the sum of tax 
revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund. 
32
 In the text we only consider two cases: 0 and 1k k  . The argument however is completely general 
and allows for any value of k smaller or greater than 1.These would correspond respectively to amounts 
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  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,i i i i i i iRBF T kGFT SQ AR T kGFT        
and using 9 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.75 0.75 ,i i i i i i i i iRBF T kGF k T SQ AR T kGF k T            
or 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 01 0.75 1 0.75 .i i i i i i iRBF k T kGF SQ AR k T kGF
            (29) 
Expression 29 is valid for any k and shows that if the guarantee fund increases (k 
rises), both assessed tax revenue and the sufficiency fund (the expression in square 
brackets) must decrease so that identity 28 is maintained. Two special cases of interest 
are when 0k   (there is no labelling) and when 1k   (the amount of resources labelled 
as guarantee fund is the one given by the new model). If 0k  , 
  0 0 0 0 0
0
.i i i i ik
RBF T SQ AR T 

     (30) 
If 1,k   
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0.25 0.25 .i i i i i i ik
RBF T GF SQ AR T GF 

       (31) 
Comparing 30 and 31 we see again that the guarantee fund is completely neutral 
regarding resources in year zero: whatever the value of k, resources before funds will 
always be equal to the sum of status quo and additional resources. 
However, given the growth rules described above, this is not the case for subsequent 
years. Consider how expression 29 varies over time. At time t, 
 
   
   
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0.75 1
             1 0.75 1 ,
t t t
i i i i
I
i i i i
RBF k T k GF
SQ AR k T k GF
 
 


    
      
 (32) 
where 
    0 00.75 1 1 .t IGF T SC      
If 0k  , 
    0 0 0 0
0
1 1 .t Ii i i i i ik
RBF T SQ AR T  

         (33) 
                                                                                                                                               
of the guarantee fund transfer (and therefore of the guarantee fund) respectively smaller and greater than 
the particular amount specified in the Law.   
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If 1k  , 
    0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0.25 1 0.25 1 .t t t Ii i i i i i i ik
RBF T GF SQ AR T GF    

           (34) 
The effect of introducing the guarantee fund can be calculated subtracting 33 from 
34. 
    0 0 0
1 0
0.75 1 .t t I t t Ii i i i i ik k
RBF RBF T GF GF    
 
       
 (35) 
The introduction of the guarantee fund decreases both assessed tax revenue and the 
sufficiency fund. The first element of 35 measures the effect of displacing resources 
away from assessed tax revenue, and the second that of displacing resources away from 
the sufficiency fund. The first effect depends on the weighted differential between the 
ITE and the tax revenue rates of growth. The second effect is generated by the variation 
over time of the AP index of needs. 
Summing up 32 over all communities, we obtain: 
     0 0 01 .t I IRBF SQ AR T        (36) 
The growth of total resources is the same irrespective of the amount of labelling. 
Whatever the size of the guarantee fund (that is, whatever k), total resources grow 
according to 36. 
In Table 12 we evaluate expression 35 in millions of euros and in elasticity terms. 
Not all communities gain from the introduction of the guarantee fund: Baleares, 
Valencia, Catalunya, Rioja and Murcia gain, but the rest loose. With the exception of 
Baleares, effects are relatively small. For instance, in Catalunya the introduction of the 
guarantee fund increases resources before funds in the first year of the quinquennium by 
104 €million; an implied elasticity of 0.0057. Elasticities differ between communities, 
but for each community, if evaluated at the same point, are constant with respect to the 
change in the size of the guarantee fund. Also, measured at the last year of the 
quinquennium, elasticities are in absolute terms about five times as large as those 
measured at the first year. 
The introduction of the guarantee fund favours communities with relative high rates 
of growth of needs, whereas the opposite is the case for communities with relatively low 
growth of needs. The correlation coefficient between one year elasticities and need 
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growth rates is 0.64. The guarantee fund also favours communities with a relatively 
high weighted difference between the ITE and revenue growth rates. The association in 
this case is not as strong as in the case of needs; the correlation coefficient between one 
year elasticities and the weighted difference ITE minus tax revenue growth rates is 0.31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12       
Introduction of the guarantee fund. Effect on resources    
  1t    5t   
  €million Elasticities  €million Elasticities 
Catalunya  104.0 0.0057 762.6 0.0284 
Galicia  -36.4 -0.0049 -262.0 -0.0248 
Andalucia  -26.4 -0.0013 -197.4 -0.0064 
Asturias  -10.4 -0.0036 -74.3 -0.0184 
Cantabria  -0.3 -0.0002 -2.4 -0.0009 
La Rioja  3.1 0.0032 22.3 0.0158 
Murcia  3.4 0.0010 24.8 0.0048 
Valencia  81.9 0.0071 604.6 0.0350 
Aragon  -10.1 -0.0027 -72.6 -0.0137 
Castilla-La Mancha  -18.8 -0.0035 -139.0 -0.0175 
Canarias  -24.8 -0.0049 -180.9 -0.0243 
Extremadura  -25.7 -0.0083 -183.4 -0.0418 
Baleares  57.4 0.0237 409.5 0.1163 
Madrid  -65.0 -0.0044 -483.4 -0.0219 
Castilla y Leon  -31.8 -0.0046 -228.5 -0.0232 
Total  0.0 0.0000 0.0 0.0000 
Source: Table A4       
 
 
9. Final remarks 
The reform of the Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers takes as its starting 
point the resources distributed by the old model (the Status Quo), and adds to this point 
fresh resources by means of the so called additional resources and the two convergence 
funds. The status quo represents 89.1 per cent of total resources. Despite that, the 
distribution is significantly different from that of the old model: it is much less 
dispersed and there are important changes in the effects upon particular communities. 
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That is, the distribution of fresh resources contributed to the system is not neutral with 
respect the distribution of the status quo. 
In the distribution of the so called additional resources, adjusted population and its 
growth play an important role and this benefits communities such as Murcia, Baleares, 
Canarias, Madrid, Valencia and Catalunya, which in the old model were not particularly 
well treated. These are also the communities that benefit from the competitiveness fund, 
which in that sense reinforces the distributive effect of additional resources. Finally, the 
cooperation fund, although it counteracts somewhat these two effects, is not big enough 
to cancel them completely. The final result is a significant flattening of the distribution 
of resources per capita (a reduction of the coefficient of variation from 11.1 to 7.7 per 
cent) and a relative improvement of the financial position of these richer communities. 
The new model is rather obscure concerning the distribution structure it implies. The 
model gives a great deal of importance to the guarantee fund and to the adjusted 
population index of needs that distributes this fund among communities. But given the 
unconditional nature of resources, it is difficult to see why this importance is granted 
and what purpose it serves. The guarantee fund and its distribution play no role in the 
definition of year zero. In year zero, total resources and their distribution are completely 
determined by the status quo, the so called additional resources and the two 
convergence funds. 
The paper also examines the growth structure of resources that the new model 
implies. The variation of total resources over time is essentially driven by a combination 
of the rate of growth of total tax revenue and the ITE growth rate. Concerning 
individual communities, the variation of about 20 per cent of resources (those 
corresponding to 25 per cent of assessed tax revenue) is driven by the growth of the 
community’s assessed tax revenue; that of 69 per cent of resources (guarantee plus 
competitiveness funds) is again driven by a combination of total tax revenue and ITE 
growth rates, but takes also into account the variation of needs; and finally, the variation 
of the remaining 11 per cent (sufficiency plus cooperation funds) is driven by the ITE 
growth rate. Although the labelling of a part of total resources as guarantee fund does 
not matter as far as the definition of year zero, it plays a role in the temporal variation of 
the distribution of resources. It favours, in particular, communities with high rates of 
growth of needs, and vice versa. The effect, however, is relatively small. 
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The main objectives of this paper are descriptive and methodological in nature. The 
empirical simulation should largely be seen as an illustrative exercise. The gradual 
contribution of new resources, the particular way in which some of these resources are 
measured in the Law (in nominal values of future years), and the severe disruption that 
the 2008-2010 cyclical economic downturn has meant for the predictability of most 
economic series, are all circumstances that render difficult an exercise such as this. 
Despite that, we believe that to gain a proper understanding of the workings of the 
model, of the relative weight of each of its variables and of the potential problems that 
the rules of eligibility of the two convergence funds may pose, it is important to 
empirically quantify the system. The numerical results of the simulation are naturally 
subject to the assumptions we have made regarding the fall in tax revenue up to 2010 – 
which will determine the initial values of the model at that year – and the annualized 
rates of growth of revenue and needs used to simulate the rest of quinquennium. 
Of the five major revisions of the system, this reform is the most expensive. It is not 
clear that the return per euro invested is particularly high. On the positive side we have 
a significant reduction in the dispersion of the distribution of resources per capita. On 
the negative side: the system has become complex and obscure regarding the 
distribution criteria it uses; its growth mechanism opens the possibility that relative 
positions change over time, and this that may be contested by communities; and, finally, 
it may pose significant management problems, particularly regarding potential 
discontinuities in the membership of the convergence funds. The main technical 
shortcomings of the model are, on the one hand, an explicit index of needs applicable to 
all resources and, on the other, a growth mechanism that, subject to the change of needs, 
keeps the year zero distribution unchanged. To practically overcome these shortcomings 
we will have to wait until the next reform, but the analysis of normative proposals on 
these issues opens an interesting agenda of future work for the academic community. 
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1 
Comparison between the old and new models. Resources per adjusted population 
 € per adjusted population  Relative deviation (%)  Relative 
Autonomuos 
0 0
i iSQ N  
0 0
i iE N
    
0 0
i iE N
   gain (%) 
Community 1 2  3 4  5=4-3 
Catalunya 2,157 2,468 99.2 101.1 1.9 
Galicia 2,225 2,434 102.3 99.7 -2.6 
Andalucia 2,252 2,460 103.5 100.8 -2.7 
Asturias 2,300 2,481 105.7 101.6 -4.1 
Cantabria 2,706 2,901 124.4 118.8 -5.6 
La Rioja 2,571 2,804 118.2 114.9 -3.3 
Murcia 2,051 2,350 94.3 96.3 2.0 
Valencia 2,004 2,344 92.1 96.0 3.9 
Aragon 2,298 2,484 105.6 101.8 -3.9 
Castilla-La Mancha 2,140 2,352 98,4 96.4 -2.0 
Canarias 1,986 2,341 91.3 95.9 4.6 
Extremadura 2,350 2,549 108.0 104.5 -3.6 
Baleares 1,910 2,350 87.8 96.3 8.5 
Madrid 2,168 2,468 99.7 101.1 1.4 
Castilla y Leon 2,253 2,440 103.6 100.0 -3.6 
Total 2,175 2,441 100.0 100.0 0.0 
CV (%) 9.8 6.7    
Source: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
 
Table A2 
Growth of resources per adjusted population (t5 vs t0) 
 € per adjusted population  Relative deviation (%) Relative 
Autonomous  
0 0
i iE N
  5 5
i iE N
   
0 0
i iE N
  5 5
i iE N
   gain (%) 
Communtiy 1 2  3 4  5=4-3 
Catalunya 2,468 3,624 101.1 100.4 -0.7 
Galicia 2,434 3,651 99.7 101.1 1.4 
Andalucia 2,460 3,658 100.8 101.3 0.5 
Asturias 2,481 3,724 101.6 103.1 1.5 
Cantabria 2,901 4,344 118.8 120.3 1.5 
La Rioja 2,804 4,134 114.9 114.5 -0.4 
Murcia 2,350 3,472 96.3 96.2 -0.1 
Valencia 2,344 3,391 96.0 93.9 -2.1 
Aragon 2,484 3,704 101.8 102.6 0.8 
Castilla-La Mancha 2,352 3,503 96.4 97.0 0.7 
Canarias 2,341 3,472 95.9 96.2 0.3 
Extremadura 2,549 3,878 104.5 107.4 3.0 
Baleares 2,350 3,223 96.3 89.3 -7.0 
Madrid 2.468 3,680 101.1 101.9 0.8 
Castilla y Leon 2,440 3,661 100.0 101.4 1.4 
Total 2,441 3,610 100.0 100.0 0.0 
CV (%) 6.7 7.8    
Sources: Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) 
0 0
i iSQ N
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Figure A1 
Comparison between the old and new models 
Relative deviation of resources per adjusted population. Year zero 
 
Old model 
 
 
New model 
 
Source: Table A1 
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Figure A2 
New model; comparison between year zero and year five 
Relative deviation of resources per adjusted population 
 
Year zero 
 
 
Year five 
 
Source: Table A2 
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Table A4 
Effect of labelling on resources before funds  
 €million 
Autonomous 0t    1t    5t   
Community   0k   1k    0k   1k   
Catalunya 16,718 18,255 18,359 26,107 26,869 
Galicia 6,876 7,523 7,486 10,812 10,550 
Andalucia 19,194 21,105 21,078 30,906 30,708 
Asturias 2,662 2,902 2,892 4,114 4,040 
Cantabria 1,636 1,792 1,792 2,591 2,589 
La Rioja 878 961 965 1,392 1,415 
Murcia 3,117 3,441 3,444 5,120 5,145 
Valencia 10,487 11,494 11,576 16,657 17,262 
Aragon 3,364 3,692 3,682 5,381 5,308 
Castilla-La Mancha 4,882 5,397 5,378 8,076 7,937 
Canarias 4,583 5,074 5,049 7,639 7,458 
Extremadura 2,846 3,128 3,102 4,571 4,388 
Baleares 2,208 2,363 2,421 3,111 3,521 
Madrid 13,580 14,998 14,933 22,518 22,034 
Castilla y Leon 6,393 6,997 6,965 10,070 9,842 
Total 99,424 109,123 109,123 159,065 159,065 
      
 Shares 
Autonomous 0t    1t    5t   
Community   0k   1k    0k   1k   
Catalunya 0.1681 0.1673 0.1682 0.1641 0.1689 
Galicia 0.0692 0.0689 0.0686 0.0680 0.0663 
Andalucia 0.1931 0.1934 0.1932 0.1943 0.1931 
Asturias 0.0268 0.0266 0.0265 0.0259 0.0254 
Cantabria 0.0165 0.0164 0.0164 0.0163 0.0163 
La Rioja 0.0088 0.0088 0.0088 0.0088 0.0089 
Murcia 0.0314 0.0315 0.0316 0.0322 0.0323 
Valencia 0.1055 0.1053 0.1061 0.1047 0.1085 
Aragon 0.0338 0.0338 0.0337 0.0338 0.0334 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.0491 0.0495 0.0493 0.0508 0.0499 
Canarias 0.0461 0.0465 0.0463 0.0480 0.0469 
Extremadura 0.0286 0.0287 0.0284 0.0287 0.0276 
Baleares 0.0222 0.0217 0.0222 0.0196 0.0221 
Madrid 0.1366 0.1374 0.1368 0.1416 0.1385 
Castilla y Leon 0.0643 0.0641 0.0638 0.0633 0.0619 
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Source: Own calculations 
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